The Future of Health Services for the Poor (1968)

Association of Schools of Public Health

The Future of Health Services for the Poor
Author(s): Hubert H. Humphrey
Source: Public Health Reports (1896-1970), Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan., 1968), pp. 1-10 Published by: Association of Schools of Public Health
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HONORABLEHUBERT LI. HUMPHREY Vice President of the United States

T nHREE YEARS AGO Dr. George James observed that “poverty is the third leading cause of death in New York City.” Dr. James was in a position to

know-he was the city’s health commissioner. His statement was intended to jolt the complacent, and it did.

The shock wave was strong because the statement was true. Poverty never appears on a death certificate. But it takes its toll: through failures in preventive medicine, fatal delays in seeking treatment, care that is inaccessible or inadequate, poor nutrition, congested living, and in many other ways that make disease more likely to happen, less likely to be clhecked,more likely to kill.

Througlhout most of human history, and throughout much of the world today, poverty has been not the third, but the first, cause of death. It is the mark of an affluent society when heart disease and cancer claim more victims than the diseases directly associated with want and misery.

Vol. 83, No. 1, January 19681

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Yet even for us, in our owvntime, affluence is only an outer shell. Beneath it are the hard facts of poverty’s toll as a disabler and a killer.

In the United Staites today, nearly one out of every three persons in fa,milies with incomes under $2,000 per yea,r suffers from a chronic condition that limits his activity; for families with incomes above $7,000, the figure is one in 13.

In the United States today, men in the age- range 45 t,o 64, the years of top productivity, average 50 days of disability per year a,mong families with incomes under $2,000; for the over $7,000 income group, the figure is 14.3 disability days.

Those who are poor go to the hospital more often. They remain longer-an average of 10.2 days per hospital stay for the under $2,000 group as contrasted with 7.2 days for the group above $7,000. This is true despite the self-evi- dent fact that they are less able to pay, less likely to have insurance which covers the bill.

Another set of statistics tells a similar tragic story. The contrasting mortality and morbidity rates of our white and nonwlhite, populations confirm the inequality of health services.

A wh-litebaby born today cani expect a life- span of 70.2 years, while a nonwhite baby has a life expectancy of 63.4 years-10 percent of a lifetinme less. Four times as many nonwhite mothers die in childbirth. Twice as many non-

wwhitebabies die in infancy.
When wveturn the spotliglht on specific dis-

eases, we see further confirmation. Influenza and pneumonia take more than twiice as high a toll among the nonwhite population. Tuberculosis- the great scourge of our grandparents’ genera- tionl-is all but forgotten except among the poor and nonwhite. Venereal disease is now largely concentrated in the core of our great cities. Nearly all the remaining cases of diseases that need no longer occur at all-typhoid, diphtheria, poliomyelitis, and others strike those who live in poverty.

Indeed, it would be possible to prepare a set of overlays of a map of the United States. One would indicate areas of high incidence of ve- nereal disease, another of tuberculosis, another of high infant and maternal death rates, an- other of excessive disability rates from chronic disease. These overlays would cover almost iden-


tical territory. And that territory would coin- cide with another set showing where the poor are congregated-in inner cities and isolated rural areas. The shadow of poverty and the shadow of avoidable disease and early death are the same shadow. They beshroud the same land and the same people.

This fact is more than a national tra.gedy. It is a national reproach. It is more than unfortu- nate; it is unconscionable.

President Johnson has said:

“Good health services a-rethe right of every citizen, not the privilege of a few. No American should be denied the opportunity for good health care because he lives in a sparsely popu- lated area or deep in the slums of a large city, because he is unemployed or underprivileged, because he is one of poverty’s young or very old, because he lacks access to doctors, hospitals, or nursing homes, because he does not know where to find or how to use health services, or because his affliction extends beyond our present knowl- edge and our current discoveries.”

He has also said, in a Special Message to the Congress, that we must a,spire to “good health for every citizen, up to the limits, of this coun- try’s capacity to provide it.”

The President believes, and I believe, that this country’s capacity is very high indeed. But cold statistical truths as enumerated show how very far below capacity we are performing for a great many of our citizens.

Barriers to Health Care

What are the barriers that separate the poor from the health care that they need and that medical science is capable of providing them? What are the obstacles that we, a’s a society, must tear down?

First, there are barriers of acces’sibility. For a variety of reasons, good health care is diffi- cult or impossible to obtain for many of our urban and rural poor.

One such barrier is based on actual shortages. As a nation we do not have enough physicians, enough dentists, enough nurses, enough sup- porting manpower, and enough hospital and nursing home beds to meet the needs of our peo- ple. These shortages affect everyone, regardless of socioeconomic status, to a greater or lesser extent.

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Photogr aph by Steve Lar8onl Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey visits a Denver Neighborhood Health Center. While par-

ents receive medical attention, youngsters crayon in the nursery.

Vol. 83, No. 1, January 1968 3

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For the poor the extent is greater, becauseof the barrier of maldistribution of the resources we have. In a study of the Watts area of Los Angeles, Dr. Milton Roemer found that 106 of the 251,000 people living in the district sur- veyed were physicians-a ratio about one-third that for Los Angeles County as a whole. Of these physicians only five were board-certified specialists. Two of the eight small hospitals in the district were approved by the Joint Com- mission on Accreditation; for most hospital services the people living in the district were dependent on Los Angeles County General, 10 miles and an hour’s bus ride away.

Counterpartsof theseconditionscanbefound in almost every major city. For the rural poor, the distributionpattern is likely to be even more unfavorable.

Meanwhile, among nonwhites, the rate of recruitment and education of potential physi- cians and dentists is still dismally low. Students in low-incomefamilies are not entering medical and dental schools at anything like the rates necessaryto do justice to their own professional interest or to the patients of all raceswhomthey might serve after graduation.

Another barrier is cost of health service.

The price of medical and hospital care is ris- ing faster than any other componentof our econ- omy. The advance of private health insurance over the past few years has benefitedmillions of Americans but few of the poor who are in most urgent need of help. The great legislative ad- vances of Medicareand Medicaid are helping to lift the burden of cost from the shoulders of the aged and medically indigent, but we cannot delude ourselves that the cost barrier has been eliminated.

Finally, there is the problemof not knowing
where to turn. Health services for the poor are
fragmentedanddispersed.Even thosethat exist
are not easy to find. The individual who needs
health care has to shop around for it. And, as
Surgeon General William Stewart recently
pointed out, “Among all the goods and services
he purchases, health care is perhaps the most
difficultfor him to shop for intelligently. The
YellowPagesareoflimitedhelpandthereis describedindigentmedicalcareasseenthrough no Consumer’s Guide. . . . The price tag is

never displayed. . . . He usually has a very vague understanding of the kind of service he


the eyes of those who receive it.
“It is delivered in ways that are deperson-

.Photograph&by Steve Larson Nurse Mary Alexander examines a baby as the

mother watches at a Denver Neighborhood Health Center.

needs and a very inadequatebasis for judging the quality of service he receives.”

Elsewhere, Dr. Stewart has said, “Today the individual gets to the right place at the right

time largely by happenstance.Many do not.” Thus, there are numerousbarriers that place good health care beyond the convenient reach

of the poor. And in addition to these barriers

of accessibility, there are also barriers of

For the care that our poor people receive

leaves a great deal to be desired,even after they have run the obstacle course to obt-ainit. Dr. Kenneth Clement of Cleveland, in his keynote address -atthe recent centennial conference of the Howard University College of Medicine,

alized and lacking in continuity. There is no Public Health Reports

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one health professional with whom the family can build a trusted relationship.

“It is fragmented care-if sick, go here; to be immunized, go there; if a.specialty problem, go somewhere else.

“The care is rendered without care for the family as a unit….

“It is often inaccessible. .

“The institutions are often distant from the poverty areas. . . . The inaccessibility is often increased by the failure of institutions to pro- vide hours that do not require the patient to miss employment-and employment often with- out sick-time benefits.”

Dr. Clement sumnmedit up this way:

“The patient must often wait long hours at overcrowded clinics in public or voluntary hos- pitals, and is not infrequently told to return on some other day when those responsible for man- ning the clinics are not available. His desire for privacy is consistently ignored and his dignity in many ways degraded.”

This is not a pleasant portrait of the health services received by one in almost every five Americans. It is a portrait of at least partial failure-by health departments, private medi- cine, hospitals, medical schools, voluntary agen- cies. There is plenty of failure to go around.

What is being done to ma,kehealth care both accessible and acceptable to those who need it most? The answer today is not enough. Not nearly enough.

Making Health Care Accessible

Yet it can be said that here and there we a-re beginning to face the problem squarely-as the single greatest challenge confronting our total medical resource. Federal, State, and local agen- cies, the voluntary health movement, the medi- cal schools, and the medical profession itself are starting to experiment, to try out new ways of reaching the unrea,ched.

found that four neighborhoods-differing eth- nic;ally and culturally but having the common denominator of poverty-accounted for most of the missed appointments.

Accordingly, decentralized chest clinics were set up in three of the neighborhoods distant from the central facility. A team functioned in each district two half days a week. Within a year the proportion of missed visits had dropped to 6.6 percent. Now the rate is 2 percent. It dropped below 1 percent in a Chinese neighbor- hood when clinic hours were set in the afternoon to accommodate people who tended to be late risers. Little things count. Human things count.

At the Federal level we estimate that fiscal year 1968 expenditures for Federal grants and payments for health care for the poor will be about $4 billion. The largest share of this amount-some $2.8 billion-represents vendor medical payments under title XIX and health insurance for the aged under title XVIII of the Social Security Act.

These funds can literally make the difference between life and death, and between health and misery, for countless Americans. But they won’t help unless the service is there for the people to buy. If these legislative advances, are to be trans- lated into health advances, we need to redesign the systems by which care is delivered.

At least a part of the remainder of the $4 bil- lion Federal investment has this redesign as its central purpose. New approaches are being sim- ulated. They alrebeginnings. But in them one can see the future strategies of health care for the poor taking shape.

A key element of the War on Poverty being led by the Officeof Economic Opportunity is its comprehensive health services program author- ized by the Economic Opportunity Amend- ments of 1966. The intent is simple and of enor- mous importance: to provide dignified pers,onal health services to low-income families, readily accessible to them, with the greatest possible

Dr. Ellis Sox of San Francisco, president of
the U.S. Conference of City Health Officers, participation in each program by the poor

reported this past June on one small but sig- nificant example of what can be done. For sev- eral years, about 25 percent of all appointments at the San Francisco Chest Clinic had not been kept by tuberculosis patients-a loss of treat- ment dangerous not only to the patients but potentially to the whole community. It was

Vol. 83, No. 1, January 1968

The geographic base of this program is not

the region or the State or even the community as a whole, but the neighborhood. The object is to put the services where the people live. But this is not the whole story. For this program is designed to attack the full cycle of poverty and


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disease. Neighborhood people are being trailled to serve in the health enterprise as community health aides and in other capacities. Health needs manpower and poor people need jobs; this program puts these two needs together.

In the very short period of this program to date, 41 neighborhood health centers have been funded. Those already in operation are proving that the concept works. Local residents are tak- ing them to heart and p,articipating enthusiasti- cally in their activities. People are getting com- prehensive and continuous personal health care that would have been far beyond their reach. They like it, and they want more.

So far, of course, these 41 centers represent only a small drop in an ocean of need. But they are generating tre,mendous attention. More than 300 communities have already expressed inter- est in joining the program. It is estimated 600 or more wvouldbe needed to reach those who could use their services.

Fortunately in other programs of the War Against Poverty-Projec.t 1-ead Start, Job Corps, Work Experience and Training-medi- cal and dental attention are helping to reduce tlhe massive backlog of disease, disability, and defects.

The Childre,n’s Bureau of the U.S. Depart- ment of Health, Education, and Welfare spon- sors a program aimed specifically at the needs of mothers, children, and youth in poverty areas. Federal grants have helped to initiate nearly 100 projects-two-thirds of them providing mater- nity a.nd infant care and one-ithird giving services for children and youth. Preliminary data indicate t,hat these are already having an impact on high infant mortality rates. Many of these projects are logical nuclei around which comprehensive care programs for entire families can be built.

Another program well underway is serving another group of deprived Americans far from the heart of the cities-the American Indians and Alaska Natives. Since 1955 the Public Health Service has been carrying out a full- scale medical care program for these 380,000 heirs of a tragic chapter in the American past. During this period infant mortality among the Indians has dropped 45 percent, and there have been similarly impressive declines in materna.l mortality, incidence of tuberculosis, and other


diseases. Nevertheless, disease and death rates for American Indians remain well above those for the general population. As in the OEO pro- gram, training and employment as health aides and sanitarians is an important part of the Pub- lic Health Service effort.

Our domestic migrant agricultural wvorkers are benefiting from Public Health Service proj- e,wtgrants wlhich help to pay for family health service clinics and other health services includ- ing direct medical care, preventive medicine, nursing aandsanitation services, and eduication in health and nutrition. Selected migran-ts are being trained a,shealth aides.

In the critically important and long nieglected field of mental illness, community mental hiealth centers are bringing treatment out of isolation in vast, remote institutions and into the com- munity setting. Recently the National Institute of Mental Health has esta,blished two centers for research, training, and services directly related to mental illness problems among the poor and the human and behavioral aspects of poverty.

An impressive project is underway inivolving collaboration between the Appalachiian Re- gional Commission, OEO, HEW, the State health department and University of Kentucky, and private groups including the United Pres- byterian Church. The aim of this alliance is to bring health services within of the rural poor in Appalachia through demonstration and planning projects. A likely starting point is the 49-county area, of eastern Kentucky where 57 percent of all families live on less than $3,000 per year and where health serviceishave been all but nonexistent.

These fewvsamples serve to illustrate a new awareness, a newvdrive to strike at the root of the health problems of the poor. They are inno- vative. They are happening where the people and the problems are. They are involving the people themselves in the solution of their own problems.

New Strategies

Most important, they foreshadow a fuiture which will require additiona,l bold new strate- gies, new incentives, new commitments oni a large, scale by all our health resources. Let me

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Photograph by Paul Conklin Family health care at Columbia Point Center in Boston includes vaccine for a small boy.

sketch out a few of these strategies that are now takinig shape and suggest others that should follow.

The first is a new strategy of health care for the poor.

This new strategy will require a sharp break with obsolete patterns and emphases. The accent must be on mobility and flexibility, on ambulatory rather than rigid institutional care. We need to put our services wlherethe need is- out wlhere the people live. The neighborhood healtlh cenitersnow in operation point the way- but we cannot afford to rest until medical re- sources are reasonably accessible to every city neighlborlhoodand every area of rural isolation. And we cannot afford to stop experimenting with new approaches and techniques.

Moreover, we need to link neighborhood cen- ters with the great medical institutions where the most complex care can be delivered. Fleets of station wagons and mobile units may be as important an investment as a new hospital wing. The person needing care must have access to the

Vol. 83, No. 1, January 1968

course of treatment he needs, wlherever it may lead.

Carrying out this new strategy will require a major commitment. The governmental and nongovernmental health forces of the nation must decide that here is where the action is, where the priority is placed. Health resources are limited. Inevitably there is competition among many worthwhile projects for the use of resources. The needs of the poor must be given primacy in this competition until the tragic gaps are closed. In the words of the National Ad- visory Commission on Health Manpower in its recent report, “Programs for health care of the disadvantaged should be given higlhest priority

and made available wherever needed.”
The new strategy of health care for the poor will require new patterns of training for health

manpower. Today, as Surgeon General Stewart has pointed out, the young physician is increas- ingly oriented to the university and hospital with “tidy, well organized, and sterilized sur- roundings,” which are the antithesis of the cha-


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otic environment of the poor. Accordingly, “his ability to understand the health needs of people in their social context tends to diminish. He doesn’t speak their language any better than they speak his.”

In short, our professiona,l schools must turn outward into the community, become involved with its needs, and prepa,re their graduates to serve there. At the same time there must be a major effort, on a large scale, to develop and use the talents of those who live in poverty areas to the fullest extent in helping to meet their own problems. It is inexcusable that health should be an island of manpower shortage in a,sea of men and women seeking useful work.

Expanded recruitment of local manpower will help to crack the communication barrier. People talk to their neighbors, and the word gets around. But there are other tasks to be done in the communications field as well. We can make much more imaginative use of television-
a much more universal medium a,mongthe poor than any form of the printed word.

Both commercial and educational television have only begun to fulfill their respective re- sponsibilities in health education. Dull pro- grams beamed at any time, particularly in hours of low viewing, are hardly the answer. The poor do listen to radio, too. Stations which know how to attract sizable audiences to “the top 40” tunes ought to be able to tell the story of the top 10 disease killers.

Other resources which can be invaluable are voluntary health organizations. They have served many Americans in low-income brackets, but their presence in the inner city is only rarely felt. There, it would be hard to find their edu- cational pamphlets telling how to recognize symptoms; their audiovisuals are little seen; their casefinding or patient-service is relatively infrequent.

Voluntary organizations-or for that mat- ter-official units cannot easily reach out to the poor from offices miles away; a branch in a neighborhood store front or a display in a local church building can help do the job much more effectively. Every means of direct contact should be utilized. Where the poor have telephones, they should be ca,lled by understanding voices, pref- erably those who “speak their own language.”

Where there are no phones, friendly volunteers can knock on doors. The poor need to know that services do exist for them, that disease is niot “inevitable” or beyond remedy. A pregnant mother needs to be asked by someone she trusts to be sure to come in for prenatal care. An al- coholic needs to be urged by someone who un- derstands his problem to seek out help. Can anyone estimate the heartbreak suffered by epi- leptics and their families because of inaccessible counsel and inadequate care?

Whether a problem requires medical or para- medical help, whether it is obvious or suibtle, potentially serious or a lesser blight, someone who cares should take it up with the patient or his family. Absence of timely help and special skills can be tragic. The lack of a speech thera- pist can consignl to a lifetime of needless dis- ability boys or girls with a stutter or stammer.

Many of the poor, including the young, have multiple handicapis. A Mongoloid childl, for example, needs not only medical attention, but special education and a variety of other profes- sional services if he or she is to realize personal potential.

As chairman of the President’s Council on Youth Opportunity, I am determined that the young should have access to timely help of all kinds, especially medicine.

Linked to this new strategy of comprehensive interdisciplinary personal health care, there must be a massive new strategy of preventive medicine. Diseases that need not happen must not happen. Diseases that can be detected and cured in early stages must not be allowed to run their course.

Poliomyelitis is almost gone from this coun- try. But there have been two outbreaks in recent years. One was in a low-income housing project in an eastern city. The other was among Mexi- can-Americans along our southwestern border. Both testify to breakdowns in delivery of health services where the needs are greatest. Polio- myelitis will be eradicated in this country; measles will be eradicated; and within a few years German measles with its terrible toll in unborn babies can be eradicated-but not until our vaccines reach every corner of the land.

Similarly we can sharply reduce the toll of cancer and heart disease and other killers and

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cripplers by applying mass multiphasic screen- ing, using refined automation fully and effectively.

Chronic disease strikes rich and poor alike. But among the poor it kills or disables many who might be spared. Cervical cancer kills poor women because, three decades after the Pap smear test was developed, they still do not receive the benefits of this simple procedure. This need not happen. We have the technology to stop it. All we lack is the decision to apply it-not as a separate and isolated effort but as an integral part of our health services system, neighborhood by neighborhood.

A third prong of our attack must conisist of a new strategy of environmental change. The urban poor live in surroundings where smog hangs heavy, where refuse collects in the streets, where rats run, where plumbing fails. These substandard conditions of the physical environ- ment are intolerable in a nation like ours.

Further, there is a second dimension to the challenge of building a healthy environment. The social climate of the poor, with its noise and congestion, its ugliness and hopelessness, its fear and frustration, aggravates conditions which breed mental illness, narcotic abuse, alco- holism, homicide, and suicide. These are epi- demic diseases that cry out for full-scale effort, not by the health partnership alone but by all the forces of society that can help facilitate a better life.

This is the key. The war on poverty is total war. Poverty and disease, ignoranlce and unem- ployment form a cycle that is self-perpetuating and self-accelerating. No total solution is pos- sible for a single segment of the problem. But by the same token, success against any salient weakens the whole.

Therefore, above all, we must pull together. In the Federal Government many agencies in many departments are engaged in this effort. OEO, HUD, Agriculture, Labor, and every component of HEW are deeply committed, not only to achieve success in their separate endeav- ors but also to achieve a total impact that is greater than the sum of the parts.

But the Federal effort is only a beginning. It needs strong allies to reach into the streets and alleys and mountain hollows where the problems

Vol. 83, No. 1, January 1968

are, where the people live, where the actionimust take place.

We need, and we seek, a true voluntary part- nership across the nation. In the health field, a major new legislative instrument has been de- signed for this purpose.

A Flexible Partnership for Health
The Partnership for Health Program under

Public Law 89-749, the Comprehensive Health Planning Act, is based on the principle that planning and action for healthi can best be done as close to the people as possible-in the States and communities. This program underwrites State and local planning. It provides wide flexi- bility for the use of Federal grant funds to meet locally determined priorities and needs. It wagers high stakes on local initiative and local decision. And the Surgeon General has already stated that in administering the program top priority will be given to projects promising de- livery of better care to the poor.

Secretary John Gardner ha,s recently sum- marized this new approach t,o the challenges that face us.

“As we look more systematically at the tasks ahead, we are finding that we must free our thinking from time-worn categories. The prob- lems won’t stay in the old pigeonholes. They aren’t Federal or State or local; they are all three. They don’t respect State or municipal boundaries. They refuse to stay in the limits of long-established fields such as vocational edu- cation or health or housing.

“So we’re learning to follow the problems where they lead. We look at a whole system-a metropolitan area, a regional watershed, or to take a very different kind of example, the sys- tem for delivery of health services. We look at poverty in all of its aspects with all of its roots and all of its consequences.”

To strike at those roots, to reverse those con- sequences must be the aim of future health serv- ices for the poor. In doing so we seek to reweave the total fabric of health care in this country so that its unquestioned excellence extends to all our people,. To do this we need new commit- ments, new incentives, new assessments of pri- ority. We need new strategies that will mobilize our health professions, our great voluntary


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associatiolns, our universities anld research insti- tuLtiolls, and our governimelntal agelncies in a common cause.

Patchwork improvements simply will niot do. Routinely pouring in increasing aamounts of public money to obsolete, overburdened, under- efficient or inefficient resources makes for neither good economics nor good medicine.

Our goal is the most modern system that free men can develop cooperatively to serve not just the poor but all Americans. As the Advisory Commission on Health Manpower observes: “Innovations introduced experimentally for the care of the disadvantaged should be carefully examined for their applicability to the care of all personis.Conversely, programs for the care of the disadvantaged should incorporate elements

from existing imethods of nmedical cale, wher- ever appropriate.”

In its Declaration of Purpose for the Com- prehensive Health Planning Act, the 89th Con- gress declared “. . . that fulfillment of our national purpose depends on promoting and assuring the highest level of health attainable for every person, in an environment which con- tributes positively to healthful individual and family living. …

Everyone who has walked in the ways of pov- erty knows how far removed we are from this high aspira,tion. Let us dedicate ourselves to a future of health services for the poor that will fulfill the national purpose by permitting ful-

fillment of every man, woman, and child in America.


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The Legacy of Hubert Humphrey

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Leaders Honor Hubert H. Humphrey

Leaders including President Clinton Honor Hubert Humphrey.

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Peace Through Change: The Risk and Promise for Man’s Future

Peace through Change: The Risk and Promise for Man’s Future
Author(s): Hubert H. Humphrey
Source: Science, New Series, Vol. 175, No. 4023 (Feb. 18, 1972), pp. 716-719 Published by: American Association for the Advancement of Science
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Peace throughChange:The Risk and Promise for Man’s Future

Hubert H. Humphrey

The only mistake that history does not forgive in people is to scorn their dreams.-MAURICE SCHUMAN,3 November 1971.

approach,which is not intended to be either exhaustive nor definitive, but rather a means of eliciting your ideas. The approachhas three main parts: (i) a common agendafor science and poli- tics, (ii) new institutional arrange- ments for the production and utiliza- tion of knowledge,and (iii) procedures for stimulatinga similar commitment by other states.

Common Agenda

The present conception of U.S. na- tional interest is too often expressed in terms of militarypower and national

To speak of peace is to speak of
change. One is a part of the other.
Their inseparabilityis rooted in their
common allegiance to the progressive
development of man’s welfare within
a compatible society. A condition of
general peace, where institutions are compassing process whose strength controllable and people comprehensi- comes from wide and solidly based ble, is, in my opinion, an ideal situa-

tion for effecting change. Not only is it ideal, it is a necessarycondition.

As society grows more complex, the

Any other situation would create
over time a perilous limbo between a
repressive sort of inertia and the ex-
tremesof violentoutbreak.Wemay foretheappropriatepoliticaldecisions very well be in that threateningkind are reached, the need is greater than

of impasse today. Peace is shockingly absent when the war in SoutheastAsia continues and is able to snuff out seri- ous effortsfor comprehensivereform in our own society. The desire for change is, I believe, as real as it ever was in the humanmind, but the failure to bring about significantchange frus- trates all of us.

There is, therefore, as much risk in

standing still as there is in moving

destructivelyout of our present posi- tion. What we should be seeking is a

means of moving forward, channeling dynamic conflict into forms of peace-

ful change. This effort will inevitably involve the reduction of human vio-

ever before to have the broadest pos-

sible knowledge base-knowledge ori- ented toward the future rather than

lence and the promotion of man’s de- society. Recognizing the weaknesses

If peaceful change is to be achieved,

This article is taken from Senator Humphrey’s lecture given on 27 December 1971 at the AAAS annual meeting in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.


community will have to provide a more systematic knowledge base. But

political leaders must also be prepared to addressthe issues. Let me offer one

growing masses of the educated young appears to be on the rise. Can means be devised that would more fully match the needs of the formerand the aspira-


a new relationshipmust be established security. Nearly half of all research

between science and politics. Politics at its best under a democratic sys- tem of governmentcan be the vehicle for translatingtensions in our society into social progress. It is an all-en-

and developmentis devoted to perfect- ing means of destruction.Worldwide, the research and developmentdevoted to military purposes probably exceeds $25 billion. Alternativeconceptionsof our long-term interests could lead to a very different pattern of resource allocation. These alternativesmust be worked out in collaboration between the scientific community and political

leaders.In my view, the new directions

would include increased attention to

population, environment and growth, healthandeducation,armscontroland disarmament, a future international system, and conflict situations.

Throughout the world, population

vitality of the political process depends to an increasingdegreeon the effective- ness and equity of the measures de- signed to achieve its basic values. Be-

growth is taking place on an unprece- towardthepast.Sciencecancreatethe dentedscale.Whataretheimplications

knowledgebase, the startingpoint for a close working relationship between science and politics.

The consequencesof science for our age are profound.Increasingly,it is the basis of our technologicalsystems, the most powerful means devised by man for controllinghis environment.

From time to time, both science and politics come under attack, as is the case today. I am preparedto acknowl- edge their deficiencies, but we must also recognize their inherent value to

for conflict and development?For any

given level of population,may alterna- tive patterns of distributionhave sig-

nificantly different implications? Since World War II, the labor force in the United States has greatly in- creased in size, and the characterof its

knowledge and skills has undergone substantialchanges. At the same time, there have been importantshifts in the occupationalstructurefrom agriculture to manufacturing,and the service in- dustries have expanded. What are the future implications for peace and se-

velopment. Development essentially in-
volves the achievementof an improved
standardof living and quality of life.
Considered in the broader context, it
is concernedwith all paramountvalues
-political, social, and economic. In
practice, the process is still incomplete;
vast inequalities continue to exist
among nations. A new commitmentis
essentialiftheprocessistocontinue. questionaretobefound.Thescientific theadvancedstates,frustrationofthe

and the strengths, we must face curity of the manpowertrends of the

squarely what is our common chal- lenge: How can science and politics, each with its constructive role, work together more effectively to meet the needs and deal with the conflicts of our own people and of others?

past quarterof a century?
In the developing world, the birth-

A strong new commitment will be tinues to widen, while the world com- necessary if adequate answers to this munity grows smaller. Meanwhile, in

rate remains relatively high, while the standardof social welfare struggles to keep pace. The absolute gap between the have and have-not nations con-

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tions of the latter? What new dimen- sions of educationare essentialto equip our nation’smanpowerto play a more effective role in metropolitanand inter- national institutions, as well as those of a nationalcharacter?

Ourtechnologicalcapacityto modify the environmenthas multiplieda thou-

transfer, whether public or private, constitutes an important source of in- fluence. As technology is diffused among nations, their relations change. In the case of advanced states, the process may reach a point where inter- dependence is maintained by a self- sustaining,reciprocalflow of technol-

agencies to shape world opinion. Pub- lic opinion feeds back to this system

by having some weight, varying in de- gree accordingto the nature of a par- ticular national political system, in the determinationof priorities and of the broad parameterswithin which leaders may act.

Significant functional institutions, such as the internationalmonetarysys- tem, are neverthelessgraduallyemerg-

ing. Multinational corporations are among the most dynamic elements now on the scene. In addition, a large ar- ray of international,nongovernmental

sandfold, but a comprehensiveappreci- ogy which serves the interests of the

ation of how to reshape the country’s capacity to provide for both peaceful change and environmental quality is

lacking.Equallyimportant,whatis the positive contributionof technology to peace and security?Systematicanalysis of the nonmilitaryelementsof strength has not been attempted since the

1940’s. A large number of excellent

specialized studies exist, but it is im- possible without a concerted effort to derive from these the nation’spotential for moving towardits goals. Four areas illustratethe scope of the task.

1) General industrialcapacity: The foundations of national security in the early 20th century-raw materials,

and those of other countries are great, military production facilities-are no there is a certain amount of mutual

manufacturingcapacity,and specialized

longer a sufficientmeasureof potential

power and influence.Are there alterna-

tive patternsof adaptationand develop-

ment to support policies for achieving

security and developmentthat can be worked out in detail and tested?

2) Energy: Energy requirements have mounted in the last two decades and are expected to rise further. En- vironmentalconsiderationscontinue to loom ever larger.What will be the fu- ture energy needs of the United States? Of the world? As choices are made, what balance should be sought from the point of view of national strength? And how are these considerationsaf-

fected by the growth of energy needs in other parts of the world and by the global pattern of energy resource de- velopment?In what sense is energy a

strategic factor in shaping the global environment?

interest.Sharingthe problemshelps to solve them and, in the process, reduces the flash points of tension between na- tions or regions. More account must be taken of this fact in dealing with these urgent national and international needs.

The arms control and disarmament

talks are now in their third decade.

Meanwhile,investmentin weaponssys-

tems has continued apace. Ironically, survival has come to depend on the

tion:Thepostwarworldhasexperienced a revolutionin the means of communi-

cation and transportation. Important

tages to the nuclear age. More funda- mental approaches must be found if the persistent threat to our survival is to be removed.For one thing, a funda- mental rethinkingof the role and func-

participants.This kind of transferhas an importantbearingon the possibilities for peaceful change.

Betterprovisionsfor health and edu-

cation rank near the top of people’s

list of hopes and expectations. While
research has provided the basis for organizations of lesser scope have

major advances in health and learning,
deliveryof servicesin the United States
remains unsatisfactory, and resources
fall significantlyshort of requirements.
Moreover,in many parts of the world
the gap between what is technically
possible and what is actually available
is immense and may be widening. of a regional system is the Common While the differences between our Market. A potentially successful, spe-

health and educational requirements

cialized institutionis the planned U.N. Commission on the Human Environ- ment.

In what respects has this array of institutions kept pace with the new

requirements of the postwar period? And in what respects have they lagged behind? How does their present con- dition and their potential for growth relateto our centralconcernfor peace-

ful change and development? Attributesof conflictsituationsvary

widely, but common to all of them is the need for knowledge sufficient for constructiveaction to enable people to deal more predictablywith other peo- ple. What then must be known for

rationality of the adversary,expressed
in terms of a strategy of deterrence.
Now, in a war of hours rather than constructiveaction? Each conflict situ-

months, their destructivecapacity may

be measuredin megatons.New agree- ments are promised as a result of the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) talks, and these are to be wel- comed. However, nothing is likely to emerge that will substantiallyreduce

ation has a particularsetting in time and space. Each has a unique set of participants for whom the situation has varying degrees of impact. The testimony of many statesmen is that they respondto events. Are there, then, preferredways for them to choose to what they will respond?What can be learned about situationsin which tak- ing the initiative is effective in reduc- ing violent conflict?

3) Communication and transporta- the role of civilian populationsas hos-

new developmentsare expected in the
next two decades. An appreciation-
strategic in scope-of the potential tions of the nation-statemay be re- However, to a degree that sets him

contribution of communications and

transportationto peaceful change and developmentis therefore essential. Are

there credibletechnologicaloptions for meeting the knowledge needs of indi- viduals in a manner that will con-

tribute to peace and development?
4) Technology transfer:Technology

18 FEBRUARY 1972

apart from all other species, man has acquired the power to create his own


Nation-states are still the major

actorsin the internationalsystem.They
have developed an array of instru-
ments to exercise influence within the our parochial perception of reality, system. These include, for example, how can a persistenttendencyto dis- diplomatic services for representation regard the values of the adversarybe and negotiation,as well as information reduced or overcome?

grown up. With the worldwide trend

towardurbanliving, metropolitanareas share common goals, even as they ex-

perience common problems.
Finally, there exist among govern-

ments regional and global institutions. One of the most successful examples

Like other living things, man is a resultof the experienceof his species.

experience. There may be as many viewsof realityastherearemen.Given

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New InstitutionalArrangements

ment commission, whose report on formation will no doubt introduce

Agreement on a common science-

politics agenda for peace and develop- ment is merely a first step. Next it is necessary to provide the institutional capacity to delineate and implement a comprehensiveprogram.The capacity, if it is to be effective, must be con- cerned not only with reliable scientific knowledge, but also with valid infor- mation for political action. For ex- ample, gathering enough knowledge to deal definitivelywith the population problem or the environmental prob- lem may be a long-term undertaking, but the time frame of political leaders

is rather short. Action are taken year by year. An arrangement is needed

which will support both systematic long-term studies and sensible short- term actions. Here an enlightened bureaucracy, which has a somewhat longer perspectivethan the elected offi- cial, has an importantpart to play.

I doubt whether there is a single

solution to providing an adequate in- stitutional framework for peace and

development. Let me instead suggest a numberof complementaryapproaches that may be valuable.

herbicideshas had a significantimpact on Congress and hopefully will have a similar impact on the other two

branchesof government.
What I have in mind is the sort of

some constraintsin independentaction, but it offersat least two advantagesthat

I think have great potential. On the one hand, an open system would in- troduce a badly needed competitive

multiplicity and diversity through element into the crucial process of which can come the balanced conclu- defining what information is impor- sions we need in our future-oriented tant for policy purposes.On the other policies. The job is not for one insti-

tution, any more than it is for one

branchof government.Guidelinesfor

the knowledge required for peaceful change should be a product of repre- sentative thinking.

estimates could help to focus the en-

deavors of Congress and the private sector, thus reducing misdirected ef- forts to a minimum.Those outside the Executive Branch would have the benefit of more informationthan they

Second, Congress should create a
new institution to provide itself and are able to gather and assimilate

the attentive public with open national intelligenceestimates.At present,both

Congress and the public must depend on fragmentary information derived

from personal contacts, committee hearings concerned with particular topics, and selective information “leaked”to the press by the Executive

Branch and by other governments. Facilities for open, systematic analysis and evaluation exist, but their activi- ties are also fragmentary.Among these are the Legislative Reference Bureau

of the Libraryof Congress,the Center

under present procedures. Congress would have a better basis for respond- ing to presidential initiatives. Com- mercialenterprisewould have a better foundationfor its investmentdecisions.

The scientific community would have a better basis for orienting its applied research and technology assessment efforts. Interest groups would have access to a body of authoritativein- formationnot now availableto many of them.

The estimates would focus on par- ticularsituationsof eithera geographic or functional nature involving major

First, for a broad knowledge base,
we need a broad base of scientific in- Kingdom, and the InternationalPeace questions of public policy. Second,

quiry. We have witnessedhow technol- ResearchInstitutein Sweden.In com- ogydevelopswithamomentumallits parison with the secret intelligence-

the estimateswould not present a posi- tiononpolicyissues,butwouldseekto provide concise and authoritativein- formation as a basis for congressional and public discussion. Third, while

for Strategic Studies in the United

own, often with little benefitto society at large. Scientists and politicians, to-

gether and separately,must ask ques- tions before they arrive at answers. Too often official researchpanels have had participantswho know the answer before they study the problem-be- cause they all agree. In most instances under governmental sponsorship, the diversity and confrontation that exist

in public conscience and among poli- tical leaders are not duplicated at the scientific level.

While making as much use as possi- ble of officialinstitutions,our govern- ment should turn more and more to

the unencumbered,independent scien-
tific bodies. Edward David, science unity of the nation. One example edge in relation to a spectrum of adviserto the President,discussedthis amongmanywas project”Camelot”in policy alternatives.
problem with respect to his own com- Latin America. Ostensibly a social The informationwould be stored in mittee, the National Science Founda- science project, the real purpose of computer-based systems. The com- tion, and the National Academy of
Sciences. He found that, despite their
excellence, these institutions did not
quite fit the bill. He stressedthe need

gathering facilities of all major governments, the open capacities for

collection, analysis, and authoritative
synthesis of policy-relevant informa- some estimates might focus on areas

tion is very limited.
While all governmentsdevote sub-

stantial resources to acquiring secret

information,this practiceposes special problemsfor a democracy.On balance, the Executive Branch acquires unin-

tended special advantages.The utility of secret informationcannot be denied,

of potential crisis, others would seek

to give an authoritativeassessmentof

selected long-term developments. An example of the former would be an estimate of the emerging situation in Southeast Asia prepared well before the war broke upon an unprepared world. An example of the latter might

but there are also major disutilities. be an assessmentof the international

Undertakingsmay be initiated which, for lack of full discussion and partici- pation by those with a stake in the outcome, may in the end damage the

implications of changes in population size and quality over the next decade. In either case, the summary estimate would seek to correlateexisting knowl-

the program, to study the possibilities puters would also be capable of pro-

of revolution and the techniques of counterrevolutionunder CIA sponsor- ship, was ultimately disclosed. The

viding assistance in visualizing and

to turn to independent boards of in- result was a general suspicion of cern themselves with domestic as well quiry or research. The AAAS has American social scientists in Latin as internationalsituations.Partof the

shown how effective this kind of ap-

proach can be. One example among many is the AAAS’s herbicide assess-


America and increasedtension in our relations with Latin American.

Open treatmentof policy-relevantin-

public concern and confusion about such problems as poverty, drugs, and crime, I am inclined to believe, stems


hand, the availability of authoritative

simulatingpolicy options.
National estimates ought to con-

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from the lack of regular and authori- national priorities, that affect what is growth vital for the more important tative assessment.Informationand mis- commonly referred to as our national peace and developmentindustries.The informationabound,butobjectiveand security.Theattemptherewouldbeto commissionshouldIbebroadlyrepre- authoritativeestimatesare rare. fortify the constitutional separation sentative of business, labor, science,

By the way of institutionalarrange- of powers and joint participation in and the public. Its primarytask would ments, I visualize a representative decision-making. National security, be not merely to determinewhat the Board of Estimates with a relatively which until now has been a gray zone nature and pattern of growth is likely small, high-caliber professional staff of ambiguity and surrender as far as to be in the years ahead, but to docu- consisting of social advisers who the Congress is concerned, has come ment what is possible and to suggest

would be responsiblefor preparingthe estimates. One of the initial tasks of the staff would be to develop channels of communication with scientists and researchworkersin all fields. Any re- search scientist, area expert, or indi- vidual who felt he had relevantknowl- edge should have an opportunity to contributeto an estimate. There should also be opportunitiesfor criticism of estimatesonce they are issued.

Similarly, the users of these esti-

tional programs and participating di-
rectly in the diplomatic process. At
present, we are inadequatelyequipped
with research and development capac-
would be available to examine the ity and commitment to deal with other nations, the commitment of the

material from which it derived. such problem areas as conflict resolu- United States to strengthen its capac-

A system of open national estimates tion, population, and the environment, ity for peaceful change may be could make an essential contribution all of which are candidates for our aborted. The United States may exer-

mates in Congress and among the public should be expected to contrib-

StimulatingReciprocal Action by Other Nations

ute to the process. If a policy-maker questioned a finding, the opportunity

Without complementary action by

participantsin the policy process free to make his own unique contribution.

not be left wholly to chance or “con- ventional wisdom,” as is too often the case at present. With the creation of an effective, constructive capacity for peaceful change, the self-interest of other nations can be expected to

Third, as congressional sources of information are expanded and modi- fied, so must the institutional nature of the congressional process mature.

adaptation.Science does not have the

corporativeintegrationthat the govern- ment has developedover the years, but

a conscious reorderingof priorities in that area should be the main focus of reform. For much of the redirec- tion, the impetus may have to come from Congress. For Congress to pro- vide this force, it will need to resort to a revampingof its own system.

Certain congressional practices and facilities need to be updated. For a

more detailed blueprint of reform, I have proposed that there be estab- lished a citizen’s committee to study Congress. At the same time I have proposed that a joint committee on national security be established to study in an integrated way some of the urgent issues, such as defense, arms control, foreign development,and

18 FEBRUARY 1972

useful. It may be especiallyhelpful in the realm of possibility that system- arranging preventive talks which atic study and analysis would not

help to keep conflict from coming to demonstratethe feasibility of creating a head. From time to time a single new complementary capabilities for

individual whose integrity is respected peace and development?

largely under the purview of the Ex- ecutive Branch. The Congress has moved gradually into this area, but never in a clear, formalized manner. The joint committee would give de- pendable definition to the kind of re- form and policies that our government should be instituting.

Fourth, I can envisage the creation of a series of national institutes of

peace and development,charged with initiating new domestic and interna-

what is preferable.With such an anal- ysis, enterprises and urban centers could more readily appreciatethe op- portunities opening for them. Cities, for example, could begin to plan for their growth on the basis of peace and developmentindustriesin contrastwith the past, when many have had to rely on weapons production and mili- tary installations.

common agenda.
The commitmentcannot be stressed

cise leadershipin the undertaking,but a reciprocal response from others is vital.

to strengtheningthe now frayed links
between public participation, political
action, researchand development,and
the allocation of resources. Attention
would be directed to common objec-
tives, while leaving each of the various strengthened. This conclusion flows to peaceful, constructive change need

Private capacity to promote ini-

The goal of stimulating other na- tions to commit talent and resources

tiativesin internationalaffairsshouldbe

from a study project with which I
was associated that surveyed the ac-
tivities of 500 organizationsand con-
ducted interviews with leaders in all
walks of life. Private diplomacy that
is not burdened by the traditional in-
Science and government can only ,flexibility of government is one im- lead them to respond. Moreover, in work effectively together if there is a portant area for new initiatives. It strengtheningour capacity for peace- parallel and complementarystructural has played a relatively important role ful change we need not rely on the in Vietnam,but it could be even more power of example alone. Is it beyond

can, by moving back and forth between adversaries,play a catalytic role.

With the building of a system of world education, the commitment I

am talking about would be self-per- petuating.This might take the form of a multicentered world university, as advocated by Harold Lasswell, or of a world system of research centers, as suggestedby Carl Kaysen, which in time might acquirea teachingfunction.

Fifth, I believe a joint commission created by Congress and the Execu- tive Branch may be needed to begin

In conclusion, let me enlarge on the challenge posed at the outset. Let us agree to commit our energy and talent:
I to the goal of peace and develop- ment;

– to a common agenda for science

and politics in supportof that goal;
– to the creation of the institutional

capacity essential for the production and utilization of knowledge in the

pursuitof that goal;

I and finally, by example and design, to inducing other nations to establish

now to identify the





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C-SPAN Profile of Hubert Humphrey

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Middle East Peace

Middle East Peace
Author(s): Hubert H. Humphrey and George Ball
Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Oct., 1977), pp. 221-225 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
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To the Editor:
During the years of my involvement in foreign policy matters, I have often

had the opportunity of checking my conclusions against those of my good friend George Ball. We have generally been on the same side, both as to analysis of a

particular problem and as to the conclusions one should reach with regard to American policy. It is for that reason that I have for some time been wondering why he and Idon’t seem to see things the same way with regard to the problems

of the Middle East. The initial intense reactions here to the recent elections in Israel, followed by what appears to have been a “successful” visit to this country

by Prime Minister Begin, lead me to air that concern.
Mr. Ball’s article in the April 1977 issue o? Foreign Affairs, entitled “How to

Save Israel in Spite of Herself,” illustrates our points of difference. It appears to be a disagreement in our analyses of the underlying problem.

The critical issue of difference often wonder why so many people point where it belongs: right up

is a simple one. It is, in fact, so simple that I

there is going to be a peace conference,

who front.

write on the Middle East fail to place this

must come prepared to make peace.
When I use the word “peace,” I don’t mean a state of armed truce. Imean the

word that describes the state of affairs that people normally have inmind when

they use the word “peace,” whatever the language may be that they speak. The Arab language has two different words that can be translated into the word

“peace.” The concept that I have inmind iswhat the Arabs call “sulch.” In the context of the Middle East, President Carter has spelled out the first prerequisite
of sulch :

the recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Israel’s right to exist, Israel’s right to exist permanently, Israel’s right to exist in peace. That means that over a period of months
or years that the borders between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt must be opened to travel, to tourism, to cultural exchange, to

trade, so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries, the people

themselves will have formed a mutual and and a sense understanding comprehension

of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and death that have afflicted that






If there are to be peace negotiations, the parties that come to that conference


As amatter of fact, George Ball does offer a very similar definition of peace in his article. His “comprehensive plan of settlement” would:

establish as a firm precondition that Israel’s neighbors explicitly recognize her as a Jewish sovereign state, and that they commit themselves unequivocally to respect

freedom of navigation in the waterways of the area for Israeli ships as well as cargoes, permit free movement of peoples and trade, and take other specified measures to assure full political, economic and cultural intercourse.

The remarks of the President at Clinton, Mass., on March 16, 1977. Text reproduced inWeekly

Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 13, No. 12, p. 361, March 21, 1977.

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He goes on to suggest that the Arabs:


same way.
Some of the writers critical of Israel have argued that demanding full recogni

must accept arrangements through leasehold or otherwise to provide Israel control over access to the Gulf of Aqaba by the maintenance of an adequate garrison at Sharm El Sheikh, accept the demilitarization of the Golan Heights, and agree to the injection of neutral forces into that area and into other buffer zones on a basis such

that they cannot be withdrawn without the agreement of both sides.

He also appears to favor linking aWest Bank Palestinian Arab state formally

to Jordan.
Where the problem arises is in the article’s suggestion that the principal

obstacle standing in the way of achieving such a settlement is Israeli intransig

ence. Israel, it says, prevents “possible progress toward peace” because “she refuses to give up the territorial gains from her 1967 conquest.” The reason why

the parties are not negotiating, the author believes, is that the Israelis “are insisting that the retention of substantial areas of their post-1967 territories is

essential to their security” and that the Arabs are “not offering unequivocal assurances of full recognition of Israel.” Neither side, he says, is thus prepared

to make the first move.
I have followed Middle Eastern developments closely ever since I first came to

the Senate in 1949.1 have been in touch with the situation ever since, have visited all the lands in question, and have talked to a great many interested persons, both Arabs and Israelis. I simply don’t see the cause-and-effect relationships in

tion constitutes insistence on an unnecessary legalism. I have also heard it said

that Israel is insisting on “political concessions” as a precondition to negotiations. These criticisms obscure the central key word: peace. The necessary first

moves to solve the Middle Eastern problem must be, as I see it, a commitment by both sides to an effort to reach an agreement that will result in peace? sulch. Israel has, I believe, made such a commitment. The Arabs have apparently not

done so.
This stark and simple fact becomes clear when we examine even the most

recent statement of so moderate and intelligent an Arab leader as Egyptian President Sadat. As late as April 6, 1977, in the same month George Ball’s article appeared, he insisted he was not offering Israel anything other than that “the

state of belligerency will end.” President Assad of Syria has recently reasserted his declarations of enmity against Israel in an interview with Danish journalists.

How can we expect Israel to announce prior to any negotiations that she is

willing to give up large areas of territory, tomove to amilitarily more vulnerable


if the other side, instead of committing itself to peace, merely suggests that itmight consider moving to what is, in effect, a state of nonbelligerence? I

am not sure to what extent such a state of nonbelligerence differs from what we have now. Israel has every right to believe, until effectively shown otherwise,

that what the Arabs are offering is a nonbelligerence signifying merely that they will not be fighting them today, but are leaving their options open for tomorrow.

What George Ball’s article stresses is that if Israel fails to withdraw from the areas occupied in 1967, another bloody war will ensue inwhich Israel’s losses will be great. I believe that Israel’s leaders in all of itsmajor political groupings are aware of the fact that this is so and are deeply concerned. But they firmly believe

that if Israel withdraws from the occupied territories and makes herself more


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vulnerable militarily without an Arab commitment to peace, another war will be

just as inevitable and Israel’s losses will be even greater. Such a concern is by no means an unreasonable one.

The experience of 1957, when President Eisenhower and Israeli Prime Minis ter Ben-Gurion confronted each other, an experience which George Ball cites with strong approval, is a case in point. We forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula without obtaining a commitment to peace from Egypt. All we

offered Israel was our private commitment to preserve Israeli access to her port of Eilat. Ten years later, years of continuing strife, Nasser established his block ade of Eilat and we did nothing tangible about it.The result was the Six Day War.

It is the memory of the consequences of the 1957 withdrawal from the Sinai that causes somuch of the Israeli leadership and general public to refuse to endorse

the surrender of territories in the absence of an Arab commitment to peace. The United States helped draft and negotiate U.N. Security Council Resolu

tion 242 at the end of the Six Day War because we knew that the only assurance

of peace in the area was direct negotiation, leading to a formal peace treaty between the parties. Israel accepted the Resolution on that assumption. The

Resolution, reaffirmed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 after the 1973 war, did not and does not require Israel to withdraw from all the territory acquired through the 1967 war. Secure and recognized borders are to be arrived

at through direct negotiations. And we must remember that the pre-1967 borders brought all of inhabited Israel within range of Arab artillery.

The recent Israeli election outcome and the statements of Menahem
the leader of the Likud party, have caused concern among many who fear an

adverse effect on peace possibilities for the Middle East. But there is absolutely no basis for believing that if the Arabs sincerely seek peace, Israel will not be

sufficiently forthcoming for peace to be concluded. Mr. Begin has reaffirmed Israel’s commitment toU.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and has publicly asserted a

desire to enter face-to-face negotiations with Israel’s neighboring Arab states on

all open questions in dispute.
We in the United States have had enough experience with elections, and I

personally believe I understand Israeli politics well enough, not to read any profound implications into the May 17 results. With all the domestic troubles that Israel has had in the last few years, inflation, strikes, charges of corruption

in government, it is not surprising that there was a shift in public opinion from

the “ins” to the “outs.” There was also an unease about

foreign policy, particu

larly in the light of what then appeared to be confusing signals from Washing ton.

The new government is led by the Likud party, which is itself a coalition of

political groups. All the partners in that coalition appear to agree to Israel’s

willingness to negotiate with her Arab neighbors pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This is also the position of the Labor Party and

the Democratic Movement for Change, the remaining major political groupings in Israel.

What I find truly inspiring about the spirit of the people of Israel is that 29 years after the creation of their state, 29 years in which the other side has been

unwilling to make peace, in which Israel has been both under military
under terrorist attack against her civilian population, the vast majority continues

to offer the hand of peace and friendship. It is time that that hand be clasped.

Ultimately, in a peace settlement, Israel will be expected to give up significant portions of the areas she occupied in 1967. Secure border adjustments are


attack and

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necessary and Jerusalem requires special attention. That, however, must under

standably come from negotiations and for peace.
Majority consensus in support of such a withdrawal can be reached in that

democratic little country. The government in Israel, whether Likud, Labor, or third party, can only make those decisions that the people are ready to accept.

That consensus would, I believe, be forthcoming if there is concrete assurance that peace will at last be established.

What we need in order to obtain aMiddle East settlement is a commitment
both sides that when such a settlement is negotiated and agreed upon, both sides will indeed be committed to peace.

What we also need on the part of the United States is a continued commit ment to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. An imposed solution,

supported by the threat of sanctions, as is suggested by the article, is not consistent with that commitment to international law or to our moral and historic commitment to Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East.

Hubert H. Humphrey Senator from Minnesota

Mr. Ball replies:
As Senator Humphrey makes clear, he and I are in accord that no settlement

of the Arab-Israeli conflict is unless the Arabs possible

what he refers to as “sulch.” It would be irresponsible to settle for anything else.

But I seriously doubt that this requirement is the most formidable obstacle to a settlement. Though the Arab leaders have so far refrained from any explicit acceptance of a full peace, they show some signs of moving in that direction and

would, as I see it, be likely to agree as part of a total bargain. Of course, if they

did not agree, no bargain would be possible. But they are certainly not going to give an explicit commitment until assured that that will result in the return of the

include the West Bank and

Prime Minister Begin have

such a concession, which

Bank and Gaza Strip that has already lasted for a decade? How long can we do so

without making nonsense of our insistence on morality in foreign policy, which, if itmeans anything, must include the central principle of self-determination for the million Arabs now living in those territories?

To answer this question one must first understand the full nature of the Israeli dilemma. Israel now treats the million Arabs presently living in the West

Bank and Gaza Strip as foreigners over whom she exercises military domination. Even if she were permitted to annex the territories?as Prime Minister Begin

would apparently like to do ? she would have to continue treating the inhabitants

as colonial dependents or expel most of them. She could not risk giving the

present inhabitants full Israeli citizenship since (taking account of the 450,000

now living in Israel) the Arabs would then constitute one-third of the Israeli

population. Not only would that high proportion undercut the fundamental

concept of an independent Jewish state, but the Jewish majority would progres sively shrink as the Arabs outbreed the Israelis.

Yet in spite of the fact that colonialism is an obsolete institution, Prime Minister Begin apparently still believes that Israel can continue to hang on to

these territories while relegating the Arab inhabitants to second-class status.

territories that the Gaza Strip.

put the Israeli

us to

Israel seized in 1967 ?territories that

the recent

government reexamine

categorical statements of

on our own




rejecting predicament.

can taxpayers be expected to subsidize an Israeli military occupation of theWest

to a real ? peace

How can Ameri long


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Moreover, he seems to take it for granted that the United States will indefinitely continue the massive subsidy of Israel’s economy and armed forces that enabled her to retain her 1967 conquests.

To be sure, he asserts defiantly that, even if American aid were to dry up, Israel would stillmaintain her present unyielding position, But Ido not find that realistic. Israel’s economy is in appalling shape, with her gross national product

only slightly exceeding her national budget. Without the two billion dollars the

United States is annually providing out of public funds and the nearly one billion

dollars the American Jewish community generously furnishes, Israel could continue as a garrison state only at drastic cost to her standard of living. Since

the hardships resulting from her present overstretched economy have already resulted in emigrants outnumbering immigrants, I cannot regard that as a


How then to break the impasse? Certainly not by trying to drag the parties

kicking and screaming to a Geneva conference that would merely freeze posi tions and lead to a shouting match. President Carter, Secretary Vance and even

President Sadat are quite right in seeking some reasonable measure of agree ment before risking a formal confrontation.

To narrow the gap will not be easy. Clearly, we must continue to insist that a settlement is possible only if the Arabs agree to a real peace ?on that point there isno room for ambiguity. But at the same time we must make clear to the Israeli

government that, if we are to be faithful to our own principles and obligations, we cannot continue to provide her with a blank check. America also has interests

in the area and a responsibility for world peace that far transcends the parochial


of the Middle East.

Though identifying with commendable clarity the elements required for a settlement, the Carter Administration has so far failed to make that point

effectively; indeed it has sometimes given the wrong signals. But it is not too late for plain speaking.

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The Nomination of Hubert Humphrey for Vice-President

Southern Political Science Association

The Nomination of Hubert Humphrey for Vice-President
Author(s): Gerald Pomper
Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Aug., 1966), pp. 639-659
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GERALD POMPER Rutgers University

T HE NOMINATION of Hubert Humphrey as the 1964 Democratic candidate for Vice-President constituted one of the most un- usual incidents in recent political history. It was achieved through

an active campaign, but one of limited public involvement. Humph- rey’s designation was achieved ostensibly through the deliberate choice of one individual, Lyndon Johnson, but only after an exten-

sive effort to direct his choice to the Minnesota Senator. All of the participants in the decision were greatly influenced by the presence of Robert Kennedy, who was not even a candidate by the time of the Atlantic City convention.

Moreover, the Vice-Presidentialnominating contest was remark- able in that it existed at all. The office involved is one which has been the object of ridicule for almost all of Americanhistory. The common evaluation of the “second counsel” was most bitingly ex- pressed by the famous Mr. Dooley:

Th’ prisidincyis th’ highestofficein th’ gift iv th’ people.Th’ vice- prisidincyis th’ next highest and th’ lowest. It isn’t a crime exactly. Ye can’t be sint to jail f’r it, but it’s a kind iv a disgrace.It’s like writin’ anonymous letters. At a convintion nearly all th’ dillygates lave as soon as they’ve nommynatedth’ prisidintf’r fear wan iv thim will be nommynated f’r vice-prisidint. . If ye say about a man that he’s good prisidintialtimberhe’ll buy ye a dhrink. If ye say he’s good vice-prisidintialtimber ye mane that he isn’t good enough to be cut up into shingles,an’ y’d bettherbe careful.L

More recently, the office has been paid greater respect. In- creasing governmental responsibilities have been placed upon the Vice-President, particularly since the passage of the National Se-

*Researchfor this articlewas conductedwhile I servedwith SenatorHumph- rey’s staff in Atlantic City under a National ConventionFaculty Fellowship.I would like to thank the Eagleton Institute of Politics, the National Centerfor Educationin Politics,and staff aides of Mr. Humphreyfor their help.

‘Finley Peter Dunne, The World of Mr. Dookey,ed. by Louis Filler (New York: CollierBooks, 1962), pp. 50-51.


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curity Act.2 The political importance of the office has increased as well, as demonstrated most strikingly by Richard Nixon’s suc- cessful bid for his party’s Presidential designation in 1960. Above all, the assassination of John Kennedy has made politicians and voters aware of the significance of the Vice-Presidency.

The Outlook in 1964

Until November 22, 1963, no serious controversy existed in regard to the future national leadership of the Democratic party. Renomination of the successful 1960 ticket was certain. Senator Humphrey, for his part, seemed to have reached the culmination of his career. After unsuccessful attempts to win a national nomi- nation in the past, he had become Senate party whip, and might expect eventually to be majority leader. The road to the White House, however, appeared blocked. John Kennedy, if re-elected, would be President until 1969. The principal alternative inheritors

of his leadership appeared to be Attorney-GeneralRobert Kennedy or Vice-President Lyndon Johnson. Certainly Humphrey had little reason to expect to be the center of activity in Atlantic City. Free of other commitments, he agreed to do a twice-daily commentary for the American Broadcasting Company during the convention.

The Dallas assassination necessarily brought great political changes. Johnson’s accession to the Presidency carried with it the leadership of the party. His nomination for a full term was rapidly assured, but the question of a Vice-Presidential candidate was thrown completely open. The most obvious possibility was the Attorney-General. It is doubtful if Johnson ever wanted Robert Kennedy on the ticket with him. There were many differencesof temperament and policy between them. A proud man, the new President naturally wanted to win the forthcomingelection without debt to the name of his martyred predecessor. Moreover, the two men had been rivals in the past, and Johnson had suffered defeat in 1960 after a campaign directed by Robert Kennedy.3

Despite his own feelings, however, Johnson had to take account

‘See Irving G. Williams, The Rise of the Vice-Presidency(Washington: Public AffairsPress, 1956), pp. 231-258.

‘ThebestaccountoftheVice-Presidentianlominationatthe1960conven- tion is in ArthurM. Schlesinger,Jr., A ThousandDays (Boston: Hbughton Mifflin,1965), pp. 39-58. StrainsbetweenJohnsonand Robert Kennedyprob- ably beganat this time.

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of the great political strength of the Attorney-General.After the assassination, Robert Kennedy became the object of deep emotional support. In the three years that his brother had been President, moreover, the national party machinery had become dominated by those close to their family. Indeed, a movement to place the Attorney-Generalon the ticket began in earnest early in 1964. In the New Hampshire primary, through write-in votes, 25,000 Demo- crats indicated their preference for him as the Vice-Presidential candidate.

Johnson played a waiting game, expecting the emotional re- action to the assassination to subside, while he preserved his free- dom of choice. To maintain that freedom, he began to create an extensive public list of possible running-mates. Inclusion of Sargent Shriver served to decrease the concentration on Robert Kennedy as the political heir of the late President. Addition of other names served to prevent a concentration of support or opposition on any other single possibility.4

Hubert Humphrey had been mentioned as a possible candidate from the first. He had the advantages of a widespreadand generally favorable public reputation, accumulated governmental experience and demonstrated ability in a wide range of subject areas. His political strength was equally important. The Minnesota Senator

was an active participant at the four previous Democratic conven- tions. He led the successful fight for a stronger civil rights plank in the 1948 convention, and was a favorite son candidate in 1952. Four years later, he actively sought the Vice-Presidentialnomina- tion and in 1960 he fought John Kennedy in the presidential primaries. Through such experiences,he developed a wide acquaint- anceship in the party, which he strengthened by a heavy schedule of attendance and speeches at the great variety of American politi- cal functions.

Humphrey’s political assets were well suited to the campaign he was about to enter. He had the broad party support and per- sonal friendships-including that with Johnson-that were to prove vital in 1964. In previous national campaigns, he failed because he lacked the resources necessary to win mass support-money, or

‘ForanaccountoftheVice-Presidentianlominationin1964,asseenfrom the perspectiveof Lyndon Johnson, see “The Choice of Humphrey,Step by Step,”TheNew YorkTimes,August28, 1964,p. 1.

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“charisma,” or professional advice.5 In this campaign, these deficiencies,where they still existed, were of less importance.

The Senator was also able to make good use of the unique position held by President Johnson. By the time the Democratic convention met, the delegates had accepted, almost as self-evident truth, the proposition that “the Presidential candidate selects his own running mate.” An unbounded prerogative was assumed to exist. Historically, this was certainly not the case. Open contests for the Vice-Presidential nomination have been frequent, and in- ternal party conflict over the choice has been common. Perhaps the only Presidential candidate who actually dictated the selection of a running-matewas Franklin Roosevelt in 1940.6 His preference for Henry Wallace aroused such antipathy-within the party, how- ever, that it was not a happy precedent for Johnson.

The freedom granted the President was historically unique. In part, it can be explained by the fact that he was still enjoying the “honeymoon” accorded a new President-a “honeymoon,” more- over, occurring immediately before the expected consummation of the November election. The Kennedy assassination, too, had left its mark. Democrats remembered,in keynoter John Pastore’s words, “that day four years ago in Los Angeles when John F. Kennedy said, ‘I need you, Lyndon Johnson.’ 117 They believed that the choice had been made by Kennedy alone and, as proven by the transfer of power after the assassination, that it had proven a wise choice. It therefore followed, in party logic, that the best choice would always be made by the Presidential candidate acting independently.

The President’s freedom, however, while greater than in most conventions, was not unlimited. Other elements of the party at least retained the prerogatives Bagehot had accorded to the British Crown: the rights to be consulted, to encourage,and to warn. John- son might have succeeded in forcing the convention to ratify even some outrageous choice, but it would have been very costly in political support, a cost he was not likely to assume.

For Humphrey, the limits on the President served to increase

‘Humphrey’sdifficultiesare chronicledby TheodoreH. White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York: Atheneum, 1961), pp. 29-36, 109-114.

‘See James M. Burns,Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Har- court Brace, 1956), pp. 428-430.

7TheNew YorkTimes,August25, 1964,p. 22.

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his own chances for the Vice-Presidentialnomination. These limits brought Johnson’s attention to focus on prominent political figures., such as the Minnesota Senator, and decreased his consideration of obscure “dark horses.” At the same time, Humphrey had the favor of the President. Coming to the Senate in the same year, 1948,

the two had always been friendly. They shared the intense experi- ence of defeat by John Kennedy in 1960. After the assassination, the Minnesotan became virtual leader of the Senate Democratic party. Humphrey was particularly prominent during the three- month filibuster on civil rights legislation, which occupied the Senate during the very time the Vice-Presidential campaign was conducted.

Unlike Robert Kennedy, then, Humphrey did not have to pressure the President into making a choice he personally opposed. Instead, his task was to persuade Johnson to make a selection he found satisfactory, at least, or actually favored personally. The strategy decided upon, more by his staff than the Senator himself, was that of “the next best man.” All efforts were directed toward convincing significant persons and groups that the running-mate should be selected strictly on grounds of ability, rather than narrow electoral appeal. A short document was distributed, usually without comment, to the press, prominent individuals, party personnel and others who might be able to influence the “attentive public” or the President himself. The theme of the document was simple:

The suddendeath of PresidentKennedy,the subsequentsuccessionof PresidentJohnson,the presentvacancyin the officeof the Vice-Pres- idency, have all underlinedthe necessityfor the Vice-Presidentto be the man next-best-qualifiedfor the Presidencyitself. . . . [Other] factors-in the nuclear age-are overshadowedby the necessity of guaranteeingthat, should tragedy befall the President, the nation would be under the most experiencedand capableleadershipavail- able.8

A small staff of the Senator’s close friends and assistants was as- sembled to spread this message. Fewer than two dozen persons were continuously involved in the campaign.

Pre-Convention Campaigning
The actual conduct of the campaign cannot be portrayed as

‘This quotation,and all other materialnot specificallydocumented,is from papersby or interviewswith supportersor membersof the staff of Senator Humphrey. I have withheldspecifictitles or namesbecausepledgesof anonym- ity were made at the time of research.

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following a logical and pre-established plan. Like most political efforts, it was marked by considerable innovation, intuition and improvisation. Chronology does not help greatly to order events, either, for several efforts were being conducted simultaneously. The organized campaign for Humphrey began in January, 1964. Com- menting on a poll of Democratic county chairmen which showed him the leading candidate, the Minnesota Senator carefully showed his interest and deference: “It is, of course, an honor to be associ- ated with President Johnson,” he replied, “and it would be a singular honor to be with him on the Democratic ticket. . . . The decision for Vice-President, however, will be made by the Demo- cratic convention, which I am confident will respect the wishes in this matter of President Johnson.”9

In the weeks following, there was only one date of crucial importance. This was July 30, the day on which President Johnson formally excluded Robert Kennedy from consideration for the Vice- Presidency. Without further explanation, the President told the press he had decided against any “member of the Cabinet or those who meet regularly with the Cabinet.”10 This criterion also ruled out of consideration Secretaries Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara and Orville Freeman, as well as Sargent Shriver and Adlai Stevenson. Until this time, Humphrey was only one of several possible candi- dates. After July 30, his backers shifted their emphasis toward building a consensus on behalf of the Senator.

The pre-conventioncampaigncan be best analyzed by observing the efforts made to win support from three important elements: the major constituent interests of the Democratic party, the delegates and leaders of the national convention, and the general public. For purposes of analysis, the latter group is considered to include the

President, although he was obviously the object of the other efforts as well.

As Will Rogers once quipped, the Democrats constitute “no organized party.” Rather, they are a heterogeneous assembly of divergent interests. Humphrey attempted to win support from all of these various groups. Labor backing was vital. In March, Walter

Reuther blocked a movement at the annual convention of the United Automobile Workers to endorse Robert Kennedy for Vice-President.

9TheNew YorkTimes,January3, 1964, p. 10. ‘0Ibid., July 31, 1964, p. 1.

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He then campaignedamong his union colleagues for Humphrey. By July, all members of the AFL-CIO Executive Council had indicated their support of the Minnesotan, and George Meany, president of the labor federation, was particularly emphatic in his support.-‘ These endorsementswere important not only as a direct aid to the Senator. They also indicated that Robert Kennedy lacked some of the support his brother held in 1960. Polls of labor leaders, taken at the behest of the Humphrey staff, also indicated strong labor endorsement of the Senator. Similarly, polls among Demo- cratic farm leaders indicated wide backing for the Minnesotan, and

this preference was reinforced by that of party leaders from farm areas.

The Senator had the early support of civil rights groups, be- cause of his long championingof their cause and his currentleader- ship of the Senate floor fight. When cloture was invoked and a strong civil rights act passed under Humphrey’s leadership, his standing with these groups was further strengthened. This demon- stration of legislative skill also caused Humphrey to exult that “an albatross has now become my greatest asset.”

Humphrey strength was notable within the party organization. A June Gallup poll of 3,000 county chairmen showed him ahead of all other contenders as the personal preference of the chairmen. Leading Robert Kennedy, the runner-upin the poll, by nearly a 2-1 margin, Humphrey headed the field in all regions but the South. In that area, he trailed Stevenson and Senator William Fulbright. With these exceptions, the Minnesotan led all other possibilities by a 2-1 marginin Southernchairmen’spreferences.

Opposition to Humphrey existed, but was restricted. As shown in the poll of chairmen,he was relatively weak in the South, where his liberalism alienated many, but not all, voters and leaders. Thus, most Southern Senators favored other candidates, but the majority whip did win the endorsement of some Southern colleagues. This support was rendered even as the protracted civil rights filibuster continued.

The Minnesotan also lacked support from the bulk of the re- maining big city “machines,”such as those of Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia. In part, this position was based on loyalty to

“‘Seeibid., March23, 1964,p. 21, for an accountof the UAW convention. The labor endorsementsof Humphreyare confirmedby TheodoreH. White, The Making of the President 1964 (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. 273.

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Robert Kennedy and the desire to have a Catholic on the national ticket. Moreover, Humphrey’s liberalism, intellectualism, and ef- fusiveness, as well as his rural, Protestant heritage, were alien and suspect. Thesegroups,however,wereneithersufficientlyconcerned nor sufficiently powerful to attempt to block Humphrey. Signifi- cantly, they were not united. In New York, for example, while older “bosses,” such as Charles Buckley of the Bronx personally opposed Humphrey, younger “reform” elements supported the Senator.

The only other element of the party potentially opposed to Humphrey was the business community. Normally, a Democratic ticket expects and seeks only limited support from industry. In

1964, however, the Republican party’s nomination of Barry Gold- water and President Johnson’s personal stress on national unity indicated increased importance for this group within the party. To gain its endorsement, Humphrey attended a series of private recep- tions for business leaders in July, seeking to allay suspicions that he was unfriendly to their interests, and accepted invitations to address groups such as the American Management Association.

No direct solicitations were made of those present at the busi- ness receptions, but volunteers were asked to let the President know their opinion of Humphrey. Others offered financial help or spoke to other businessmen on his behalf. Although all of them did not later support Humphrey, those attending the meetings included President Eisenhower’s Treasury Secretary, the president of the New York Stock Exchange, and executives of such firms as Sears Roebuck, Metropolitan Life Insurance, General Dynamics, New York Central Railroad, Anaconda, and Inland Steel. Members of both parties and leaders of corporationsof various sizes were in- cluded. The emphasis was toward proportionately greater repre- sentation of Democrats and middle-sized firms.

These various efforts were directed in part at gaining the support of the President. They were undertaken, however, in recognition of the fact that the President would be influenced by the opinions of the many elements in the Democratic coalition. That Johnson did not have a completely free choice was indicated by the elimina- tion of Defense Secretary McNamara. This occurred well before the July 30 announcement. Labor leaders strongly objected to the inclusion of a former corporation president on the national ticket, particularly one associated with the Ford Motor Company, a tra-

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ditional opponent of Walter Reuther’s Automobile Workers. Mc- Namara’s rejection of a 1961 AFL-CIO nomination for a Defense Department position had also aroused resentment. Party organiza- tion leaders, particularly the Michigan state party and National Chairman John Bailey, also were severely critical of the possible nomination of a non-political figure and one, moreover, who had voted for and contributed large sums to the Republican party. Faced with these objections, the President recognized the political limits on his freedom of choice and rejected the Defense head.

The second major effort in the pre-convention campaign was directed toward the party convention delegates. This effort was care- fully discreet. No “pressure”was applied, and the Humphrey group was extremely cautious to avoid any action which might seem to be an attempt to force the hand of the President. The basic purpose was defensive, to be prepared for any change in the situation.

Many of the actions in this period were directed toward pre- paring for a possible floor fight. In part, this preparationwas due to memories of the 1956 convention, when Adlai Stevenson had allowed the convention a free choice of his running-mate. Surprised on that occasion, and conditioned by their past experience, Humph- rey backers did not want to be caught off guard again should Johnson allow the delegates to make the decision. Few, however, expected the President to permit this freedom. Far more likely, it was thought, was an attempt to stampede the convention into the nomination of Robert Kennedy by an emotional invocation of the late President’s memory. Such an attempt was feared even after the July 30 statement.

To prepare for any open contest, the Humphrey group began to canvass delegates. Although similar in many respects to a Presi- dential campaign, the effort was far more reserved. The friend-

ships, contacts, and knowledge gained in four previous conventions were put to use. The Senator’s supportershad learned, in Theodore White’s words, “The root question of American politics is always: Who’s the Man to See? To understandAmericanpolitics is, simply, to know people, to know the relative weight of names-who are heroes, who are straw meni,who controls and who does not.”‘2

Delegates were won without primary election contests or open attempts to win commitments from state parties. In a few cases,

2White, op. cit. (1961), p. 136.

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known supportersof the Senator were contacted and asked, if possi- ble, to win designation as convention delegates. Since no contests were expected at the national convention, party leaders of moderate influence were able to win places without controversy. In order to judge the strength of the various candidates, a letter and informal poll was sent to pro-Humphreyleaders in each state. Dated July 30, the letter asked for the preferencesof each delegate among four Vice-Presidentialpossibilities: Robert Kennedy, Humphrey, Shriver, and Stevenson. Space was left for indications of the past convention status of the delegates and remarks. Copies of the poll results were to be sent to a designated “local coordinator”and to the unnamed “resident” at a suburban Washington address. The anonymity of the poll indicates how careful the Humphrey group was to avoid an open campaign and to respect the freedom of the President. The date of the letter, and its list of names, indicates that the Senator’s backers were not informed any considerable time before the President eliminated the major rivals of the Minnesotan.

In reply to the poll, varying assessments were received. A majority of the delegates were prepared to accept Johnson’s Vice- Presidential preference, but among the contenders, Humphrey had the most support. With this information, his backers were reason- ably well-informed as to the sources of support for each possible candidate. Robert Kennedy, in this informal poll, was shown to be the second strongest contender. However, his support was less broadly based than that of Humphrey, being centered in the north- east. AlmostallsoutherndelegationswerestronglyopposedtoKen- nedy’s nomination. Significantly, while not enthusiastic about Humphrey, they were willing to accept his designation. Some dele- gates favorable to Humphrey not only answered the poll, but also announced their preference to the local press or wrote to the Presi- dent on Humphrey’s behalf.

Even the best of plans might go astray. Some preliminary thought was given to a convention organization, but these tentative plans ultimately were abandoned. Many in the Humphrey group feared that the convention would become “an emotional bath” in memory of John Kennedy, and that this would lead to the nomi- nation of the Attorney-Generalfor Vice-President. In news inter- views and in a trip to Poland and Germany, Robert Kennedy seemed to be publicizing his qualifications. A poll taken by this writer indicated that he was the choice of a plurality of New Jersey

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delegates, and similar support in other states had been found by the Humphrey group. Rumors were current that Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy would attend the convention to arouse emotional support for her brother-in-law.

To avert a Kennedy bandwagon, Humphrey backers hoped for public support of the Senator by President Johnson before the opening of the convention, and these wishes were partially met by the public disapproval of Robert Kennedy on July 30. Their anx- ieties were further relieved when the Democratic National Commit- tee changed the convention program, deferring a special memorial tribute to President Kennedy, introduced by his brother, until after the nominations were made. The postponement was also announced on July 30, reportedly after a personal decision by the President.13 In the event, the memorial did become the occasion for a spontane- ous emotional demonstration. Delay helped Humphrey.

The President’s actions left the Humphrey staff free to concen- trate on building support for their own candidate, rather than defending against any other possibility. After the July 30 state- ment, the White House, probably upon the personal direction of President Johnson, encouraged Humphrey to develop support in his own cause.’4 The Senator and his staff then expanded the third phase of the campaign, seeking the support of the more general public. Best characterized by one aide as “a campaign not of silence, but of restraint,” it was oriented toward gaining the en- dorsement of influential officials, public spokesmen and the press, without stimulating a mass movement which might offend the President.

One means of maintaining this delicate balance was to isolate Senator Humphrey himself from most of the overt activity. The sampling of delegate sentiment and other sensitive tasks were left to the staff and friends. The Senator kept himself before the public by his activities in the Senate. He accepted a number of invitations for television interviews, speeches and press conferences. Though

non-political in inspiration and content, a half-hour television pro- gram on “My Childhood”was particularly effective.

Humphrey also continued his contract for television commen-

“The New YorkTimes,July 31, 1964, p. 9.

“White, op. cit. (1965), p. 273, confirms this statement and names James Rowe as the source of encouragement. It seems unlikely that Rowe acted with- out prompting in so vital a matter.

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taries during the convention with A.B.C. The Minnesotan had many personal reasons, including financial need, for adhering to his earlier commitment. Politically, it would have been difficult to withdraw from the agreement without appearing to pressure the President. For similar reasons, Humphrey continued as a delegate to the con- vention and even appeared on the floor before his own nomination.

While the Senator remained available, discreet public support was stimulated. At this time, all politically important visitors to the White House were being asked their opinions on the ticket. Even Senator Humphrey was asked about his rivals. As he de- scribed the situation later to a reporter,”It’s like a guy calling the girl next door-who he knows is madly in love with him-to ask the phone number of the newest broad in town.’15 When friends of the Senator expressed a desire to aid his nomination efforts, they were provided with basic information. A diagram was prepared, comparing the biographies of the leading potential nominees. With- out comment, it demonstrated the greater variety of experience and longer political services of the Senator. One could note, for example, that in 1948 Humphrey had been a leader in the Demo- cratic convention and had been elected to the Senate. In the same year, Robert Kennedy had entered law school, McNamara had held a middle-level management position, and Eugene McCarthy had been elected to his first term in the lower house of Congress.

The Senator ultimately won the endorsementof a large number of opinion leaders, including some 40 Democratic Senators and, according to a White House survey, “nearly all significant party figures in 26 states and the District of Columbia, and a clear ma- jority in six additional states.”’16The mass media were also con- tacted discreetly, and some columnists and editorial writers virtually endorsed the Minnesotan. The New York Times, for example, while making the customary acknowledgementthat “the power to choose his running mate lies, as it always has, with President John- son,” also pointedly described Humphrey as “a man with experi- ence, broad interests and demonstrated integrity and capacity

a man of Presidential quality.”‘7
Through most of their campaign, the Humphrey group had em-

phasized the argument of “the next best man.” As their campaign

“Ihe Making of HHH,” Newsweek (September 7, 1964), p. 19. “8TheNew York Times, August 17, 1964, p. 1.

17Ibid. August 18, 1964, p. 30.

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widened, they attempted to prove the electoral appeal of the Senator as well. At first, this was a purely defensive maneuver. Great suspicion was voiced about the membersand staff of the Democratic National Committee, and their possible support of the Attorney- General. Members of the Senator’s staff, in some cases, felt that the President might receive incorrect reports, warning him of possi- ble defeat in November unless he ran with Robert Kennedy.

More positively, the Humphrey group attempted to demonstrate the political strength the Minnesotan would bring to the ticket. A poll taken by the White House showed that Robert Kennedy was indeed the most popular of the Vice-Presidential possibilities, but that Adlai Stevenson was considered the most qualified. Significantly,

Humphrey placed second in both categories, indicating that he might be the best over-all choice. In late May, a national sample was questioned on the standing of a possible Republican ticket of Goldwaterand William Scrantonin opposition to Democratic tickets of Johnson and Humphrey and Johnson and Robert Kennedy. In these matchings, the Johnson-Humphreyticket received 2.1% more of the “vote” than the Johnson-Kennedy slate. The Senator’s ad- vantage held in all subdivisions of the sample except among Cath- olics but, still, a Johnson-Humphreyticket received of that

group’s support.
The nomination of Goldwater was also turned to Humphrey’s

advantage. Geographically, the nomination made the Mid-West, where the Minnesotan was strongest, the crucial area for November. The Republican choice also centered the contest for marginal guber- natorial, senatorial and congressional seats on this area. The Democrats could now regard the East as relatively safe, making it unnecessary to nominate a candidate from that area, such as Robert Kennedy. Analyzing probable patterns of group voting, a number of political scientists found reasons to support Humph- rey’s candidacy. Seen as crucial to the party were a large increase in the number of Negro voters, a consolidation of union members behind the ticket and an appeal to farmers of the Mid-West and the Plains.

To win this support, it was argued, would require an intensive campaign by a well-known, popular and effective candidate. Since such an effort could not be mounted by an incumbent President, it would fall to the running-mate. Humphrey,it was said, did have the stamina and popularity to win new Negro support, curtail the


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“white backlash” among union members, encourage a defection among Republican farmers, and assume much of the campaign’s duties for the President.18

To be sure, Humphrey still representedsome political liabilities. He was relatively weak in the South and among businessmen and Catholics. The importance of each of these groups was indicated, respectively, by Goldwater’s “Southern strategy,” his conservative ideology and his Catholic running-mate,William Miller. However, the long pre-convention campaign had lessened the opposition to Humphrey’s nomination among all of these groups. As the Demo- crats prepared to open their convention, the Minnesota Senator w-asclearly in a leading, if not yet dominant, position.

At the Convention

In Atlantic City, the attitude of the Senator and his staff was a combination of hope and anxiety. All were sure that Humphrey was the choice of the various elements of the party and that he was accepted by the delegates and the public as “the next best man.” They believed, too, that he was the President’s own personal prefer- ence. It was now clear that Robert Kennedy would not challenge his elimination from the contest, but was instead preparing to run for United States Senator from New York. Nevertheless, problems remained.

The first of these was keeping Humphrey activities within bounds. By the time of the convention, the support of the Minne- sotan had become so obvious that it was dangerous. The Senator’s group feared that the President would feel himself pressured and, in order to reassert his own power, would recommend another candidate. To avoid offending and alienating the President, plans for the convention were drastically revised. Humphrey’s headquar- ters at the Shelburne Hotel became instead the Minnesota delega- tion’s headquarters (and therefore available for use by Senator McCarthy as well). Reservations for large numbers of rooms were cancelled or forfeited. The staff, including Humphrey’s administra- tive assistant, was scattered through many hotels in Atlantic City, with many listed as attached to A.B.C. rather than to the Senator.

“8Thereportwas preparedby Donald G. Herzberg,directorof the Eagleton Instituteof Politicsat RutgersUniversity,afterconsultingvariousassociates, includingthe presentauthor.

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Many efforts were made to dampen any overt campaign. A reception on the convention eve was sponsored by the Minnesota state delegation, rather than by the Senator. Staff members were told not to discuss the Vice-Presidential nomination in public. If asked, they were to reply that the President was free to make his own decision, and that all persons should support that decision. Humphrey took this position himself on the innumerableoccasions he was asked for personal comments. In this atmosphere of un- certainty, rumor and anxiety flourished.’9

A second and more serious threat to Humphrey was the con- test over the seating of the Mississippi delegation. The regular and all-white delegation was challenged by the “Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.” This integrated group had little legal claim to convention seats, based on state law and past practice. It did have a strong moral claim, however, considering the deliberate exclu- sion of Negroes from political participation in Mississippi, the spate of segregationist terrorismin the state during the summer,and the likelihood of disloyalty to the national ticket by the regular organization.

In terms of convention politics, the Mississippi contest did not really center on that state. Whatever the decision, it seemed unlikely that Negroes would be permitted political participation in the state, that the regular party would support the national ticket, or that Johnson would carry the state in the November election. The real concern of the party leadership, including John- son and Humphrey, was to avoid a floor fight. They wished to present an image of unity and rationality to the national television audience, in contrast to the emotionalism and divisiveness of the Republican convention at San Francisco. They wanted also to pre- vent a walkout of other Southern delegations, and a consequent weakening of the party’s strength in the region of Senator Gold- water’s greatest appeal.

It fell to Humphrey, by dint of the President’s request and his. own prominence at the convention, to seek a formula which would satisfy these demands. The Senator was in a delicate position. Since he was relatively weak in the South, he had to conciliate that section. A walkout by Southern delegates, moreover, might con-

19Theinfluenceof rumor at a national conventionis vividly describedby Aaron Wildavskyin “What Can I Do?: Ohio DelegatesView the Democratic Convention,”in Paul Tillett, (ed.), Inside Politics: The National Conventions 1960 (New Brunswick:Rutgers-The State University, 1962), pp. 112-119.

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vince the President and the party that the ticket requireda more moderate candidate for Vice-President. Even if he had wanted to, however, Humphrey could not consider the Southernposition alone. A floor fight could be obtained if eleven delegations on the Creden- tials Committee signed a minority report and if eight delegations requested a roll call vote. The Senator, therefore, had to find a settlement which would represent an overwhelming consensus, not merely a majority position.

At first, the Senator argued for a three-point proposal known as the “Wymong plan.” The regular Mississippi delegation would be seated, if it took a loyalty oath to the party. The Freedomparty would be welcomed as non-voting guests of the convention. Finally, in the future, state parties would “assure that voters in the state, regardless of race, color, creed or national origin, will have the opportunity to participate fully in party affairs.” The proposal was presented to a subcommittee headed by Walter Mondale, At- torney-General of Minnesota and a Humphrey supporter. It won endorsement there by a 4-1 vote, but failed to win the necessary

consensus in the full committee.
To leave time for more bargaining, the report of the committee

was delayed for 24 hours. In this period, one change was made. “In recognition of the unusual circumstances presented at the hearing, and without setting any precedent for the future,” two members of the Freedom Democratic party would be seated as voting “delegates-at-large.” The Humphrey communications net- work was activated, every state delegation was contacted, and the influence of the White House was brought to bear. The new plan won the support of sufficient delegations to prevent an open con- vention conflict. The compromisewas rejected by both Mississippi factions, but Humphrey’s objectives had been fully met. The party had recognized the moral claims involved and had taken at least a token action against discriminationin party affairs. Party unity had been preserved and all but the intransigent Alabama and Mississippi delegations had remained loyal.

For the Senator, the result was a personal success. Dealing with an emotional issue in the frenetic atmosphere of the conven- tion, he had solidified a broad coalition within the party. He had demonstrated his leadership without severely antagonizing any element. The solution of the credentials contest removed the last potentially serious obstacle to his nomination.

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It was still conceivable that the President would indicate a different choice, and accomplish his selection. At this point, how- ever, there would be an extremely high price to pay in disaffection and resentment. The President had preserved his freedom of ac- tion to meet any new development, but no such development had occurred.The Minnesotan had come to the convention as the lead- ing candidate. While there he had retained, even strengthened, his position.

The remaining period was one of waiting on the part of the Senator and of managed drama by the President. By Tuesday, the day before the nomination, the Senator was informally notified of his selection. Buttons, signs, and hats with “Johnson and Humph- rey” designations-in preparation for a week-were ordered for final delivery to a private home. Aides began writing an acceptance speech. Johnson, in Washington, continued to suggest names, to fence with reporters,and to build tension. Finally, on Wednesday, hoursbeforethenominationitselfwasschedulecdh,ecalledHumph- rey to the White House.

The final dramatic moment came that evening immediately after Johnson had been nominated by acclamation. In an unprecedented action, he appeared to announce his choice of a running-mate. His speech indicated the success of the Humphrey group’s basic strategy. The President argued their thesis, that the Vice-President should be “a man best qualified to assume the office of President of the United States, should that day come…. This is not a sec- tional choice; this is not merely just a way to balance the ticket; this is simply the best man in Americafor this job.” He indicated as well

the success of the campaign to win public support for the Senator, when he noted that the choice was reached “after discussions with outstanding Americans in every area of our national life” and represented “the enthusiastic conviction of the great majority of the Democratic party.”20 Humphrey’s nomination by acclamation followed.

The political value of the long selection process was indicated the following week when the Harris survey asked voters their opinions of the Vice-Presidential nominees. Humphrey led the Republican candidate by a 7-3 margin. Moreover, he was pre- ferred over Miller more than the President was preferred over

“0TheNew York Times, August 27, 1964, p. 23.

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Goldwaterin every area of the country and among virtually every social group. Significantly, the major reason for Humphrey’s sup- port was that he was considered “better qualified, [more] experi- enced” than his opponent.2′ The public, too, had accepted the thesis of the “next best man.” The final test of this choice came on November 3, when Hubert Humphrey was elected Vice-Presi- dent of the United States.


The nomination of Senator Humphrey points the way to the future of the Vice-Presidency. In the past, whatever attention was given to the office centered on its governmental,rather than political, aspects. This focus was evident among politicians as well as acad- emicians.22 The recent history of the Vice-Presidency should serve both to increase attention to the office in general and to foster particular interest in its political character.

It seems likely that we will find more campaigningfor the office of “second counsel” in forthcoming elections. The Presidential nomination itself has gradually become the object of public and vigorous campaigning. As some candidates adopt these practices

for the running-mate position as well, others will be required to follow their example.23 Such efforts will certainly be evident when an incumbent President is a candidate for renomination. With the top position on the ticket thereby foreclosed, ambitions will be directed toward the second slot. Campaigningis unlikely, however, to attain fully the intensive, openly competitive and mass character of a Presidentialeffort.The influenceof the Presidentand otherparty leaders will remain too great to enable a candidate to win nomina-

2″TheHarrisSurvey,in The PhiladelphiaInquirer,September4, 1964,p. 3.

22Most of the literatureis concernedeither with the duties-or lack of them -of the Vice-Presidentor the problemsof Presidentialsuccession. Aside from the works cited above and below, see John D. Feerick,From Failing Hands

(New York: FordhamUniversityPress, 1965); Louis C. Hatch and Earl R. Shoup, A History of the Vice-Presidencyof the United States (New York: AmericanHistoricalSociety, 1934); ClintonL. Rossiter,”TheReformof the Vice-Presidency,”Political Science Quarterly,Vol. 63 (September,1948), pp. 383-403; Ruth C. Silva, PresidentialSuccession (Ann Arbor: University of MichiganPress, 1951); Irving G. Williams,The AmericanVice-Presidency: NewLook(NewYork:Doubleday,1954);LuciusWilmerding”,TheVice-Pres- idency,”Political ScienceQuarterly,Vol. 68 (March, 1953), pp. 17-41.

2″SeeGeraldPomper,Nominatingthe President(Evanston:Northwestern UniversityPress, 1963), chaps.5, 7, 8.

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tion largely on the basis of popular backing.24 The attempt, rather, will be to gain the support of important factions and to use evi- dence of voter appeal to win such backing.

The campaigns for the two nominations will be alike in one other respect. They will be exercises in the building of coalitions. The entire nominating process is one of building a majority coali- tion. In the past, the Vice-Presidential nomination has been one of the prizes used to build a consensus in support of the ticket- leader. If the Humphrey case is indicative, the second spot will no longer be simply a trading device. There will be efforts to build a consensus behind this choice separately or, more likely, the same coalition will be evident in the selections of both candidates. We are less likely to see “balanced”tickets, in which the two running- mates represent distinctively different positions. In both parties in

1964, there was an ideological consistency to the tickets that is startling when compared to such combinations of the recent past as Dewey and Bricker or Stevenson and Sparkman.

The choice of a coalition, by definition, is different from the choice of a single individual, even one with the responsibilities and political acumen of the President. The common belief, con- stantly reiterated in 1964, is that the Presidential nominee selects his own runningmate. This view, albeit with guardedqualifications,

is also frequent in the scholarly literature. “The Presidential nomi- nee ordinarily can, in fact, make the choice, although the range of his discretion may differ with circumstances,”25wrote V. 0. Key. “When a presidential nominee is named, he and other party leaders sit around in a room and select the vice-presidentialcandidate,”26 declared an experiencedpolitician. “The opinion of the presidential

24AsDonald Young suggests, “Most campaignsfor the second office will continue to be conducted under cover, since in most cases the Presidential candidate will make the choice, and he will not likely react favorably to effortsto bringpublicpressureto bearin behalfof a particularcandidate.”See AmericanRoulette (New York: Holt, Rinehartand Winston,1965), p. 313.

“‘V.0. Key, Jr., Politics,Partiesand PressureGroups,5th ed. (New York: Crowell,1964), p. 429.

“CharlesHalleck,cited by Hugh A. Bone, AmericanPolitics and the Party System,3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill,1965), p. 333.

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nominee is always the most important influence,”27 according to others.

A closer look at the record of vice-presidential nominations, however, results in a different conclusion. Paul David examined the four conventions since 1896 in which an incumbent President sought renominationwhen the Vice-Presidencywas vacant. In all four cases, “the President was able to exercise only limited influ- ence on the situation…. Seemingly the choice tended to be made by the convention, with other leaders exercising as much influence as the President.”28 Even in 1964, there were limits on the Presi- dent, though they were less constrictive than in the past.

Not only is this contention incorrect; it is wrong as a matter of principle. In a free society, there is nothing inherently objec- tionable in the nomination being “an instrument of compromise- compromise between factions, between sections, between interests and even perhaps between back room political bargainers.”29No democratic system can easily accept the proposition that the vital choice of future leadership is the prerogative of any single indi- vidual. In 1964, the President did endorse the individual who was the clear choice of the majority of delegates and of party factions. The outcome, then, did not violate fundamental demo- cratic beliefs. The proposition of unlimited Presidential discretion, however, does violate these beliefs.

The emotions aroused by the assassination of John Kennedy permitted the unusual freedom accorded the new President. It was felt that he was entitled, in effect, to name a successor to his now-

“7MalcolmMoosandStephenHess,HatsintheRing(NewYork:Random House, 1960), p. 157. See also William Goodman,The Two-Party System in the UnitedStates, 2nd ed. (Princeton:D. Van Nostrand,1960), p. 213-“The presidentialnomineeby well-establishedcustomis consideredto be entitledto a majorvoicein the selectionof his runningmateandin somecasesdesignates him outright.”

“8PauTl.David,RalphM.GoldmanandRichardC.Bain,ThePoliticsof National Party Conventions (Washington:The BrookingsInstitution, 1960), p. 59.

29EdgarW. Waugh, Second Counsel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,1956), p. 198. Waugh’s own preferenceis uncertain. He seems to disapprove of bargainingforthevice-presidentianlominationandevenabstractlytofavoran appointive vice-president.His final conclusion,however, is: “It is good to have competitionfor the nomination.But the competitionshould be among those whom the Presidentialcandidatehas indicated as highly acceptableto him.” In practicalterms, such a method might be no more than a disguisefor dictationby the Presidentialnominee.See Ibid., pp. 198-208.

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vacant office, and that Kennedy’s successful choice of Johnson indicated the desirability of unlimited freedom. However, Kennedy did not act alone-he stated his preference and then worked among the leaders of his party to win agreement. This is far different from leaders passively accepting a designation. The Dallas tragedy should remind us of the significance of the Vice-Presidency and of the importance of the choice of a man to that office. In a democracy, important choices must be made through widespread participation, not through the personal preferences of a few leaders.

The nomination of Hubert Humphrey was accomplished in part through such participation, but it offends a democrat’s sense of decency that any one individual should be accorded even the theoretical right to deny the popular choice. Whatever our reac- tion to the specific selection made in 1964, we should reject the premise. Consent, not dictation, is the basic process of free government.

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